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By  letter of 17  June  1970  Mr.  Scelba,  President of the 
European Parliament,  informed Mr.  Scarascia Mugnozza, 
Chairman  of the Political Committee,  that the  subject 
of the next  joint meeting of members  of the  Consultative 
Assembly  and  the  European  Parliament  on  17  September 1970 
would  be:  "The  future  of European unification and  action 
by Europe  for a  policy to benefit the  developing  countries". 
The  European Parliament's.Bureau instructed the 
Political Committee  to prepare  on  this subject a  working 
paper which took into  consideration the  opinions  furnished 
by -the  Committee  on  External Trade Relations  and  the 
Committee  on  Relations with the African States  and Madagascar. 
'The  Consultative Assembly,  for its part,  has  prepared/ 
two  papers  on· the  same  subject for the meeting,  one 
drafted  by Mr.  Emreh:n  and  the  other by Mr.  Vedovato. 
The  opinion  of the  Committee  on  External Trade 
Relationsi  drafted by Mr.  Westerterp  (doc.  PE  25ol84/d~f.) 
was  adopted  by that  Comrni ttee on  1  Sep·~ember 1970,  whilst 
the  Committee  on  Relations with the African States and 
Madagascar adopted its opinion,  drafted by Mr*  Bersani 
(doc.  PE  25.111/def.)  on  3  September-1970,. 
Both  ~hese opinions are  appended  to  the Political 
Committee's  working paper. 
The  Political Committecl's  paper,  which was 'drafted 
-by Mr.  Tr.ib()Ulet,  was  unanimously adopted  by  the  Commit·~ee 
at a  meeting  o:a  7  September 1970 • 
.Th~ P  ..  oJ.i.tlg_C!l-2.£.I].ill.ll~~  ...  ,~  .. s  Illee.ting  was  atten0~ed  );>~: 
Mr.  Scarascia Mugnozza,  Chairman 
Mr.  Burger and Mr.  Cantalupo,  Vice-Chairmen 
Mr.  Tribo111et,  Drafter 
Mr.  Aigner  (for Mr.  De  Gryse),  Mr.  Amendola, 
Mr.  Baas  (for Mr.  Hougardy),  Mr,~  Behrendt  (for 
Mr.  Carcassonne),  Mr.  Berkhouwe:r  (for Mr.  Achenbach), 
Mr.  Berthoin,  Mr.  Brouwer  (for Mr.  Schuijt), 
Mr.  Corona,  Mr.  _Furler,  Mr.  Glraudo,  Mr.  Glesener, 
Mr.  Habib Deloncle,  Mr.  He in,  Mr.  Jahn,  Mr.  Lautenschlager, · 
Mrl»  Luecker,  Miss  Lulling  (for Mr.  Dehousse), 
Mr.  de  la Malene,  Mr.  Mueller,  Mr.  Terrenoire,  Mr.  Tolloy 
and  lVIr.  Wohlfahrt. .:. ii  -
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WORKING  PAPER 
on 
The  future  o.f  European unification 
and action by Europe  for a  poliqy to 
bene£i  t  the developing o ountries 
Drafter:  Mr~· Triboulet 
1.  To  be  appointed  by the European Parliament as its 
rapporteur fo:r  the  joint  mee-l;ing  of the Parliament  and  ,the 
Council  of Europe  is an  honour which  I  fully appreciate;  for 
the subject chosen ·for  the meeting is  one  which has  a  direct 
·ana  precise bearing  on the responsibilities  of the  European 
Economic  Community  and.  the European Parliament. 
The  subject is:  "The future  of European unif"ication and 
·action by Europe for a  polj~cy to benefit the developing countries". 
Now,  it .is our belie£,  at least,  that t,he ·way to European 
unification lies through the European Economic  Community. 
0  0 
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I 
~OPEAN  UNIJ?ICATION 
2,  Nobody,  of course,  imagine{3  that Europe  can be  confined to 
the  s:l.x  countries  of the European Economic  Community.· 
The  politicians of the six states represented in the European 
Parliament are no less aware  than those  of the'  o~her Eu:ropean 
na-tions what  important  and  fundamental  problems the preservation 
of pf3ace  in Europe  involves,  problems  of  a  /w·orld-wide  nature 
which go far bE:yond  the-framework  of the  Community. 
3.  There are thus a  wide variety of possible approaches to 
Euro}?ean  prol'}lems  in general.,  the  diplomatic  p~ob1ems raised by 
Europe,  the  leading  ones  being those  stemming  fro~ the  secoxill 
world war,  from the' sphere;3  of influence which are  more  or less 
the result· of  the Yalta negotiations 9  from the difference  ~n 
political systems,  fro-m  the division of (}ermany,  etc...  -
It should be  made  clear,  however  that this wider diplomatic 
Europe  is not the  subject  of tb.is report. 
4.  I  am  not  unaware  of the  great value there would  be  in 
discussing,_ for  example t  WJr"  Brandt r s  policy and the recent tr-eaty 
between the Federal Republic  of  Germany  and  the  Soviet Union;  but, 
o.pa;rt  :from  the danger  in discussing political events ·whose  pattern 
is not  yet  clear, that is. assuredly not the subject which Yfe  wish 
to c.onsid'er at this  joint meeting  and  with which this report  is 
intended to  deal~, 
0 
0 
5.,  Our  subject is European u:rd  .. fication9  that is to say,  what 
has  been done  and  what can  ~boo  ao1ie·-t"'o  unite Europe.-
This brings us  back to the European institutions that have 
fused-within the European Economic  Community. 
6.,  I  do  not wish to challenge the priority of··the  Cbuncil  of 
Europe,  to which  I  am  proud to have  belonged at the  outset·,  but 
in common  parlance,  which·~ in my· opinion rei'lects -the real s·ituat:ion., 
it is not  the Council ·Of  Eur"Ope  and.  its larger- .framework that 
-people hav·e  in mind  when they speak a.,bov.t  the un:Lfication  of.  Eur.ope.  __ 
The  Council of Europe has nonetheless  much  to its credit  even 
in this field;  the_ discussions  initiated by  our distinguished 
colleagues in this great Assembly were  a  cause  of European · 
1-mification and  they are  now  helping to maintain a  climate favourable 
to that unity in both political and  public  opinion. 
~/. - 3  -
It might  be  said that the Counoil  of Europe  is the 
inspiration behind European unification and that it is the 
institutiox?-s  of the European Economic  Community  which  carry 
that inspiration·into effect. 
?o.  We  readily acknowledge the Council  of Europets position 
as parent  or  sponsor but it is to the six members  of the 
European Economic  Community that is due  the formidable  honour 
of being the ·actual builders  of a  tm.ited Eu::rope. 
Those  who  have  ~orked and  arc  working  on this  construction 
of a  united Europe  have  never  concealed from  themselves  how 
lj_mited it was at present. 
8.  Not  to mention the appeals  which were  made  to Great Britain 
when: the  first  of these  institutions,  the Coal and  Steel Community, 
was created and again when Euratom was  founded  and  the Treaty of 
Rome  for  a  common· market  was  signed - politicians, from· 
Jean Monnet  and  Robert  Schuman to those Who  are  before you today, 
have  al,rvays  been intent  on working for unification, but by  · 
opening to the rest· of Europe  each  of the institutions  ~hey 
were responsible for establishing. 
If they had to confine themselves to six countries, it was 
not  for want  of desiring unification -ot  a  wider kind. 
0 
0  0 
g.  l  feel all ·the freer to talk about this because if  ·you 
refer to the  early debates in the Council  of Europe  you will see 
that  I  Vitl.s  among  the "institutionalists". 
My  politj  .. cal friends  and  _I  we~e even then  ~n favour  of 
unification that included political unification;  we  wanted 
there to  be  established  ~f'or  as  many  European countries as possible 
institutions that w.ould  have  permitted  joint political discussion 
,and hence  movement  towards  gr~ate¢ unity. 
10.  But  the  11functionalists"  wo11  the  day and  as it is quite 
futile to try to rewrite history it must  be  observed that 
European unification,  in the present situation,  is the 
establishment  of first,  the  Coal  m1.d  Steel Community,  then  , 
E·uratom,  then the Cor.unon  Market and finally the European Economic 
Community  combining the three institutions.  · 
Y1e  are convinced it would  be foolhardy to try to be'gin 
European  unification all over again and,  so to speak,  d·eal  out 
the cards  once  moreo 
./~ - 4-
11-.- Anyone  wa..11ting  to- talk seriously about the future of European 
unification - which  .is·  our  sub je·ct ·:  .....  must  st&~t with~_the Ruropean 
Economi.c  Corrnnuni ty  •.  ·._Its  signii'iy!i'nce  should not  be under#isttmated, 
for~  dovm  the  ages  the idea  of Europe  has  assumed  a  wid·e  variety of 
forms  in terms· of  ideas  or culture,  but  -c;nis  old  continent  of ours 
had not  prevtously been unified except  under the  sway  of  conquerors 
or federalising  princes.  · 
12~- It took two world ware  and tens  of millions  of deaths fo:r 
six European states finnlly to decide, of their  own  ~ccordjto unite. 
Thts  may  seem a  mode/st result;  but it is however  a 
considcra1)le  ono,  for the Six wore,  willy-nilly,  drawn into both 
sides in those murderou.s wars. 
In any event,  the  effort by these six nations to unite is 
the  only  original attenpt  ever· knovvn  to begin a  process  of  . 
unj_t'ication among  six old ·European nations despite everything which 
diffe:rentiates  them  - history,  language,  traditions.  · 
13  ~  In the words  of the Heads  of State  or governnent who  ne.t  in 
The  Hague,  11the European  Comounities remain the  original nucleus 
fran vvhich European  unity may  spring and  develop". 
.  I  would  add  that the European nations vvhich  are nembers  of 
the  Council  of Europe appreciate perhaps even better than any 
other nations  in the  world how  precious this :initiation of 
European  u.nification among  six countries is in a  world  wl:J..~ere 
nationalism. is asserting itself nore violently than ever., 
14-~  Indeed,  the racial and  linguistic conflicts· fr.om  which the 
cont:tnent is free  make the Cor:munity  of the Six  seen a  kind  o.f 
. encbanted  isle~  It is assuredly  our duty to precerve ·at all 
costs this hope  which still rests  on  so snall a  foundation  •. 
··~ 
..  Europe,  which through the centuries has been a  pi.on•:;er  in the 
horrors  of war,· is t.oday  a  pio11eer in peace  and unity.  ~ 
.Let  us  ensure  the success  of'  the exat1:ple.  it is setting" 
0 
Ql  0 
15.  S ot1e  nay be  tenpt  ed to query the European Ec on  oDic  CoDDuni"ty rs 
val:tdity as  a  unify:Lng. force.  Tl1e  be.st"  answe-r  t.o  those  people is 
to toll then to lock at the  European regulations already in 
. existence:  there are  a  substantial·nunber, o:f  such regulations, 
and in the  custo:os  sphere and  the field  of agricultural policy 
they constitute a  body  of European legislation of decisive 
iOl')O:rtance·fl - 5 
The  sane  people  should  also be referred to the list of 
opinions and  reports drawn up  by.  the  Con:rnission for the  Council 
to the  agendas  of the European Parlia:o.ent 's sessions  and to the' 
texts being prepared at  Co:rnr1ission  or Council level. 
·16.  Step  by step,  to b·e  sure1  but  in fact swiftly,  the system 
founded.  by the Treaty  of Ro:oe  is being completed  and  deepened  · 
through tho whole  field  of  exch£4""1.ges,  soon co1:1Jnerce  and  in the, 
foreseeable .future  - with  a  three-year tine-table  and  parallel 
progress  by social policy - econonic  and  nonetary union. 
Who  could dispute the  unifying  r~sults already to be  seen 
in the  political sphere,  with regard to  pr"oblens such as those 
concerning agricultural production or the status. of the 
·.C)  professions?  vVho  does  not  appreciate the political inpact  of 
the  P?SitioJ:~ taken up  in,  for. i.nstance  1  nonetary natters, which 
conpel the  S~x to adopt  an att1  tudQ  towards  the Eurodollar r.1arket · 
-•~·'  and  hence tovvards  our  relation~ with the  United States  of Anerica~ 
17.  H~ve we  _not  been induced for the past  two years to 
co-ordinate  our  actions  in this essential field  o;f~ our Atlantic 
re.lations,  Vllith  our authorising of the  Cot1r.1iss_ion  to ne·gotiate 
with the United States in the Kennedy Round  and  with  our  joint 
protesting against certain protectionist nanoeuvres  on the 
other side  of the Atl-antic?  · 
In short,  who  could deny that the  path being taken by the 
CoLJmunity  of the Six is the  one  that leads to unification? 
18.  On  the forn  of this unification our  Qpinions  nay differ: 
sonc; who  constitute the  najority of the European Parlianent  e~na· 
have  already expressed their views in nunerous texts and reports,· 
have  long  been thinking in terns  of federal institutions;  others, 
like nyself,  have always wanted Europe to go  as far as politi¢al 
unification, whilst wanting its institutions to be  confederal. 
·"  This was  appreciated,  noreover,  by the Heads  of State  or 
· governnont  at their neeting in The  Hague:  after ensuring the 
decisive  step concerning the Coonunityts  own  resources,  they 
'"'  instructed the  Foreign Ministers  ttto  study the  best way  of 
achieving progress in the natter of political unification". 
19.  And  so  on 20 July the Foreign Mi.nisters  drew up a  repo:rt 
where  we  find  again that pattern for the  i~tiation of political· 
unifico.tion which  was  enbodied in the  Foucher Plan as far back 
as 1962  but  which~  was  so unfortunately rejected at the  time 
because  of rivalries between individuals and nations • 
.  The  f'act  that a  political cormittee  conposed  o:f'  the heads 
of the  political departnents  of the  six Foreign Minis-tries has 
been set up  and  is ~ving the way  for the periodical 
ninisterial neetings where,  a.  com1on foreign policy will at last 
be  discussed is a  considerable. step,  even if sone  consider it to 
have  been taken tinidly. 20-~  And  so  in twentjr years the Europe  of the· Six has a·dva.n:ced-
f'ron coal and  steel to foreign policy,  that not-able area  of 
national sovereign·ty. 
Thus  we  nay hope for  joint discussion,  even-the franing  of 
a  co:r:n:1on  policy.,  on all the najor probleiJs which  deterninc  the 
.future  9f the  Six,  or tonorrow ·of the  Ten,  united European 
. na·btons.  There  would  then at ·lust be  the appropriate franowork 
for tho Gernan problen,  left in abeyance  for  25  years,  and  for 
relations with Connunist Europe,  dispelling the latter's 
unwarranted suspicion of'  our  uni:f.ication ef'fort  and  avoiding the 
pitfalls of bilateral approaches. 
Undoubtedly,  :f..n  the  course  of this progress towards  European 
unification  ·neeti:ngs  of Heads of State  or governnent  will be 
necessm~y fron tine to tine so that the political resolve to  ' 
'Progress further nay be exerted at the highest  level&  But  we  have 
already extracted the  naxinun fron the Treaty of Rone  and this· 
inpl1os that  our su governnents will  be  capable  of negotiating 
such further treaties as are needed for .the European Econonic 
Oonnunity to becooe  a  conplete European Oonnunity equiJ:?l)ed  with 
suitable  institutions~ 
0 
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!!f.LARGEMENT · 
\. 
2lo  It is against the  background  of tlrls  :progress towards 
unification i:;hat  the  problen  of  en1argenent  is raised by the 
applications  of the United  King~1on and several other EFTA 
co1.trrtries. to  join the  Con:ounity. 
The  value  of  the  subject  of  our. discussions at this  joint 
neeting  .....  viz.,  the future  of'  European unification- is 
precisely, it seens to ne,  that it rais~s the  probler:1  of 
enlargenent in te.rme of'··the  future  of unification. 
This  is the  standpoint to which  I  should  like to confine 
nyself here  in discussing the entry of the United  Kingdon and 
.l  the  other applicants.  .  . 
22.  This aspect,  I  feel, is all the Iaore  inportant  becau~e 
it is the  one  that is talked about least, the  one  that  was not 
even nentioned  in the earlier negotiations- despite being 
Hthe  heart  o.f  the nattertt  - and the  one  that  is in fact  the 
key  ;tssue:·~ 
If European unification were not  involved,  we  would  need 
sinply to discuss financial and  connercial interests. 
23.  This report would  contain an analysis of the British White 
Paper  or  of the latest calculations  supplied  ~y the :experts. 
We  would  draw up  a  connercial  ani  financial balance-sheet for 
the entry of the United  Kingdon  or the  othel-- applicants 'with 
the _price to be  paid iDIJediately Ul40n  entry,  the  expected fut-ure 
prof:1ts,  etc. 
~t  that,  precisely  t  is not the  subject  of  OUt"  SJ.iscussions 
today.  We  have  but  one  questj~on,  though a  f~ndanental one,  to 
consider,  vizo t  will enlargenent enable progress towards 
up.ification to be continued or wi'l.l' unification have to be  given 
~~  up?  Or  - another possibility - will our  progress towards 
unifica."tion be  slo1ived  down,  this baing conpensated for  by the 
wider goal of  a.  ten-nation Europe  ins~tead.  of  a  six-nation one? 
24.- At  the  present  stage  of  the~negotiations it seens very 
difficult 'to answer this key question. 
To  be  sure, the  1962 precedent nay  cause  us  anx~e·cy, 
progress. towards unification having been slowed down allegedly 
in order to obtain an.d  ;facilitate enlargenent. 
25~  But the rejection of the Foucher.  Plan ·in_ 1962 is now,  I 
believe;·  unanmously re-gretted  and  I  do  not think anything need 
he  inferred :tron that unfortunate precedent. L 
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Moreover,  the  :ract that not_ only have  discussions--_begun 
between tho  Hi:x:  and the applicants  on tariffs and  trade  problet1s 
but that there has also been J?rior agreenent  on  the  oorrr1on 
agricultural policy  shows·that the United  Kingdon,  in particular, 
i,s  aware  that the European Econonic  Connunity is not· linited to 
ooul'Joroial  or even  econonic interests but that it involves 
political problern  which foreshadow unification  .. 
26-.  Things  should,  however,  becone  clearer with the_ renainc1er 
of tho negotiations,  which cannot  be confined tc agricultm--al 
problens but will have to deal,  for instance, with e,cononio  policy, 
nonetary policy and  even social policy. 
I  think I  have  shown in the _opening  paragraphs  of this 
report tha·t·,  wi~ly-nilly, with :reservations  on  particular points 
on the part  of  eac)l of  our  six states,  we  have  finally agreed  to 
advance towards  greater unity. 
27~  Is the Uni'ted  Kingdon which has not  gone  through,  one  by  one, . 
the  sar1e  stages with us,  noved by the sane  spirit? 
That is the question. 
·~ 
· 28.  Since this question of decisive inportanoe to the  futu:re 
arises·; it can  be  seen that European unification is at this very 
nonent  undergoing a  crucial test. 
This test, it·seens tone, is not the  one  that is generally 
talked about,  viz.,  whether nenbership can be  ag:r·eed  on quickly 
or  whethcT  we  shall have  to be satisfied With tenpora1.  ... y  arrangcr1ents 
such as  prefe:rent:i.al agreenents,  which night be  transforned nore  or 
less autonatically into nenbership. 
29~  Tho  .. real test will concern tho 1J01itioa1 will  o.f the  Connon 
Market  Six and  the  four apl:)licn,nts at the  end  of the negotj.ations, 
whatever the  precise  outcone  nay be.  Will we  have  converted,  so 
to speak,  'the four applicants to the  cause  of Euro.pean unificatiqn? 
Will they agree Dore or less willingly both to accept the  Connon 
Market  as  j.t  stands and not to ,slow down  its progress  towa:cds 
political union?. 
30~  The  difficulties  o:f  the negotiations,  or the :financial 
. sacrifices to be nade  by all of'  1.,1.s-,  are,  I  feel,  nuch less to be 
feo.rea than a  change  in ·the spirit which actuates us. 
The real danger to Europec.n unification :ts that the negotiators 
will pr.efer to sacrifice  all or·-_part·,of-unificati-on i.n  order·to 
lessen, their naterial sacrifices.  _- : 
31-~- In short, the question is whotherthe·eeononic  asj_)ectw±lltt-ake· 
prio~ity over the  political one-- in which case there will-b? a 
painful CODpronise  over  econoDiC  j~ntorests  and  progress  toward.s 
unii:"ication will be halted - or whether the  political aspect will 
take priority over thG  econonic  one  - in which case the  econonic 
arrangenent will be  of  secondary iDportance  and  the  key objective 
will be to work  out  a  cannon Europeax1  policy in the Didst  of  world 
politios.  ·  , 
0 
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III 
A  POLICY  TO  ·BENEFIT  THE  DEV'ELOPING  COUNTRIES  ...........  .........~---· ..  -~  ~ 
32.  Undoubtedly,  the  direction given to European unification in· 
the  coning nonths will have  a  bearing  on EU:ropets efforts to 
assist the  developing countries. 
This is where  the  two subjects  chosen for  our discussions 
are  connected;  for the bilateral aid. supplied by each European 
nation is a  fact that is independent  of the  exist·ence  of the 
European Econonic  Corn:1unj~ty in its present  or  an enlarged forn. 
33.  Ever since the conclusion of the Treaty  of Rone  in 1957, 
however·;  there  has  been a  specifio-ally European effort to assist 
~,  the developing  countries,  an effort with. a  character  of its ovm 
and with its own  doctrine  and nethods., 
l 
Consequently, if the CoDDunity  of the Six is-· strengthened, 
the specific nature  of its assistance to the developing countries 
will becono nore pronounced. 
34.  As  far as  enl~genent is concerned,  the  fact that the :united· 
Kingdon  and the  other applicants also :provide  the' developing 
countries \rdth  substantial aid oeans that there are two 
possibilities,. viz.: 
(a) 
(b) 
Either enlargeoent. will be  of a  predoninantly econooiQ 
nature in which case there will be  a  kind ·of adding 
togother  of the efforts being r,ade  for the benefit  o£ 
the  deve·loping countries but  a  weakening  of the specific 
charact.er  of . the aid  so far supplied by the  Six;. 
Or  enlargenent  will also  eobx-ace  the  political aspect, 
in ·which case,  on the  basis  of the  developnent  aid  . 
doctrine  of the Six,  tho ten-nation Connunity will draw' 
u:g  its own  policy in thi·s field as  in all fiel.ds  of 
world  politics.  · 
35.  In order to gain a  better understanding  of the  choice thus 
offered; .by the negotj.ations  on onlargenent,  we  should consider 
in turn: 
(i) 
(ii). 
(iii) 
What  tho  Six individually,  and  the United Kingdon 
are doing in regard to develo:pnent aid; 
The  extent and  nature  of the aid.  specif.ically 
supplied by the European Econonic Cor1nunlty; 
The  place  of'  such aid m the  world-wide. patterh ·of 
assistance f'ron the nore developed to the less 
developed nations. 
0 
0  0  ./~ - 10  -
36.  For many  reasons the European count-ri.es  have  a  special. 
mission to assist the developing-countries. 
The  first reason,  of ·course,  is that they arc  developed 
nations whose  technical and  economic  progress. since the second 
world war  has  been considerable  and  whose  living standards have 
rison rapidly<>  But  there is also  the fact  that it t1as  Europe 
which through the  c-enturies·,  dtscover.ed new  lands,.  set up not 
only trading posts but permanent  concerns in every continent,  for 
better or .for worse  acquired colonies in successive stagcsin all 
climos,and then decolonised those  countries one  after the other. 
37.  In short,  there has never been  a  Europe  confined within 
Europe  t s  geographic  a~. boundaries_.  The  six nations which united, 
first for coal  aT.\d  steel,  then for nuclear energy  and finally f"or 
a  common  market,  realised that it was  impossible to construct 
a  united Europe  without  taking  account of Europets extensions 
throughout  the  world_,  and  since colonisation had happily been 
followed by the ideal of co-operation the former  colonies of three 
of tho  Common  Markct-r,·s  siX members  freely associated their--futures 
with that of the European Economic  Community. 
.;. - 11  -
38.  Thus  the  assistance being given to  the developing countries 
·comes  very largely from Europe  {albeit at present  on  a  .  · 
predominantly bilateral basis),  for each European .stn.te has 
realised that it must  respond to this wqrld-wide  mission of 
Europets to which  I  referred. 
Lot  us  quickly go  over what  each of the six EEC  countries 
and  the United Kingdom  are doing  f'or  the .benefit of the third 
world  (1). 
(1) 
./. 
If a  developing, country is defined as  a  couhtry who::;;e  gross 
national product  does not  exceed per capita,  $500  a year 
the developing.countries in each geographical region are  as 
follows  (the list is a  very variegated one_,  oecause there 
a.re  many· degrees  between .  $0  and  $500 • 
.  A(t.iSL<a=  Algeria,  Angola,  Cameroun,  Congo  (K),  Ivory Coast,  c 
Ethiopia,  Gabon,  Ghana,  Uppe1~ Volta,  Mauritius,  Kenya, 
Libya,  Malawi,  Mal:t,  Morocco,  Niger,  Nigeria,  Uganda,  Uriited 
Arab Republic, .l\1a.dngascar,  Rhodesia,  Senegal,  Sierra Leone, 
Sudan,  ~icmz-nnia,  To~o; Tunisia,  Zambia  • 
. South  Asia:  Burma,  Ceylon,  India,  Pakistan. 
~J!St  .1\§.i.Q::'  Cambodia,  China  (Taiw~), South. Korea,  Hong  Kong,· 
Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Papua,  New  Guinea,  Philippines,  . 
Singapore,  Thailand,  South Vietnam . 
.§9JJ&h£.!1l~~UrQJl.~:  Cyprus_,  Spain;  Greece,  Portugal,  Turlcey, 
Yugoslavia. 
Latin  ~~tD.~£.1£.a:  Argentina,  Barbados,  Bolivia,  Brazil, 
Chile,  Colombia,  Costa Rica,  El Salvador,  Ecuador, 
Guatemala,  Guyana,  Haiti,  Honduras,  British Honduras, 
Jamaica,  Mexico,  Nicaragua,  Panama_.  Paraguay,  Peru, 
Dominican Republic,  Surinam,  Trinidad  and Tobago,  Ur'uguay, 
Venezuela.  · 
Middle East:  Iraq,  Iran,  Israel,  Jordan.,  Lebanon,  Syria. 
/ - 12  ... 
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39~  Gernan:r' s  aid to the  develo]!ing countries  (both official and 
non,...,..officJ.al.  sources)  anounted to 694 nillion dollars in 1962  and 
1,663 Dillion in 19681  representing  0.69%  and  lo25%  respectively 
of gross national product.  Official aid  anounted  to 518 billion 
dollars .:Ln  1962 - 416  Dillion  (80%  of the total)  in bilateral  · 
c ontri  but  ions anc.  102 ni11i  on  ( 2  d1o)  in nul  t ilat  eral c ontri  buti  ons • 
In 1968  the figures  were  as  follows:.  total aid,  754 n:Lllion 
dolla1~s;  ·bilateral aid,  654 nillion (87%);  nultilateral a1d, 
100 nillion  (13%).  . 
In 1.968  Ger1:1any  contributed  30·~ 4  nillion dollars in the foro 
of grants to the European Developnont  Fund  (E1)l
1
)  and  10 nillion 
to the United Nations  Developnont Progranne  (Ul'IDP);  to this 
should  be  aclc1ed  39~9 nillion subscrj.bed to the  International 
Devo.lolJDont .A.ssociation  (IDA) 1 3.4 Dillion to the  World  Bank, 
3.4  mi~lion to the Asian Developnent  Bank  (ADB),  2~7 Dillion to the 
Worlc1  Fooc1  PrograribQ  and  11 nillion to other United Nations agencies. 
The  percentage  decrease . in nultilateral aid  in no  way 
signifies a  change  of policy in th:ts respect;  it was  due  to  e. 
tenporary delay in the  pa.ynent  of contributions to the European 
Developnent  Fund~ 
40.o  Al*bhough  Gernany has  shown.  a  narkec1  ]!reference for  bi.L'lteral 
aiel,  it is nevorthel.ess  prepared to supply a  considerable part 
of its assistance  on a  TJultilateral basis9  Thus  in 1968  Gernany 
·cane  ir.rr..1ecliatoly after the United, States in terns  of official and 
non-offici.al capital· aid,  easily exceeding the target  of 
1  1;er  cent  of  groos national p:cbduct  ado!fl;~J. by the second session 
of  UNCT.L\.D.  . 
41~  The  gedg:t''aphical  spread  of  Gernanyt·s bilateral air1  in 1968 
was. as follorvs:  "to  Europe,~ 89~2 nillion dollars;  to Africa, 
13841 Dillion.;  . to Asia,  289o6-Dillion;  to Anerica,  75.4 nillion; 
niscellaneous  and  unclassified-,  40o2 nillion - total 
632 .5· nillj  .. on d. oJ_lars.  .  -• 
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BELGIUM  - -··  '"""' 
42.  Belgiuu1s  official and  non-official aid totalled to 
118 Dillion dollars in 1962  arid  243  Dillion in 1968.  This· 
reprel3ented  1.14%  of national  inco~1e  and  0.91%  of  GNP· in 1962 
and  l.L1r6%  of national incone  and 1.17%  of GNP  in 1968.  .  .. 
,  Official aid anounted to  69~8 nillion dollars in 1962  - · 
55/)6  IJtllion  (79%)  in bilateral aid and  15.2 Dillion  (22%)  in 
nultilato.ral aid  •.  For 1968 -the  figu:re  \l\JaS  93  nillion dollars  -
73.8 r1illion  (79%)  in bilateral aid and  22  nillion  (21%)  in 
nultilateral aid  • 
. Offici  a~ bilateral atd  i.n 1968  was  shared  out  as follows: 
Europ<:i.  ~-~8 nilliol} dollars;.  Atriqa-,  63.8 nillion; .  Asia, 
4.5 IU lJ..on;  Aner1.ca;  2.1 DJ..llJ..on.  ;  · 
43.,  Belgian aid:,  while reDaining concentrated i:p.- Central Africa, 
is showing  a  slight geographical diversification as regards. bilatera _ 
aid ancl  an:i.ncrease  as regards nultila.teral aid;.  ·It should also 
be noted that Belgiun has accepted in principle  UNCTADts, ne\v 
target  o:f  1%  Of  GNP,  having  al;ready achi:eved· it· several· .tines 
since 1960.  ·  · 
Multilatera~ aid paynents ·in. 1968  were as :follows: 
m~ .  !:),gencies 
Eur~ Dev.  Fund 
Eur·.  Invest  .•  Bank 
Asian Dev$  Ba:.nk 
Vlorlc1  Ba:nk  (bonds)· 
2·-~·9 
8~5 
2~3  o·.5 
5·.0 
Total:·  19.2 
nillion dollars 
tt .  tl 
"  n 
tl  u 
tt  ~/ tt 
u 
:·'---
44.  Belgian· aid is concentrated in the three Central l'Qrican 
countries  (Congo,  Ruanda and  Burundi),  tbese· having 'received_ 
· :r:1ore  than SO%  of 13elgiunts bilateral flow in 1968  (60 nillion 
out  of  74 nillion dollars)~  TJ:?.o.  Congo will renain the  principal 
beneficiary in the cooing  years~t· but there  have  been recent  signs 
of  sane  desire for geographica,l -diversification. 
FRA.NCE  -
45 o  France  has always  been anong the principal dop.or  c-ountries 
as  regards both the volune  of its capital flow  and  the 
relationship between that flow and  GNP. 
Official and  non-official aid totalled  1,395 nilJ.ion do11P.rs  in  1962  and  1 1483  nillion in  1968~  represent1.ng  2.-06%  and 
lol.7%  ,o.t:  GNP  respectively.  The  flovv  frolJ tfue official sector 
anounted to,747 nillion and  855 nillion in  1962  and  ~968 
respectively a:nd  thnt fron the non-off'icial  sect  ar to 
477 nillion and  628  Dillion. 
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46~  The  breakdown  of official aid in 1962  and  1968 was  as 
follows  (provisional figures):  bilateral aid,  900.million 
(88o6%)  and  807  million  (94.4%);  payments  to multilateral 
organisations,  116  million  (11.4%)  and  48 million (5-e6.%),. 
making totals of 1,016 ml.llj_on  and  961 million  in.  1962 
and  19~8  respectively~ 
Most  of French bilateral aLd  (418  m~llion out of 
807  million dollars  in 1968'  i.e  e  52%)  he~s  bean. geared to 
technical assistance,  accounting for more  than  28%  o~ the-
total amo-wJ.t  devoted in this respect to all the  D.A.C  \l) 
countries., 
Official  bilat~ral a±d was  apportioned  irt  1967 
as ·  follo,rJ"s:  Europe  9  18 million dollars;. Africa'-··· 45&  million 
(of which  298  million to  the Associated African States 
and  Mad:agaecar);  Overseas  "departements''~,  240  million; 
Overseas  Territories~  54  million;  Asia§  56  million; 
La  tin Amer:tca,  25  million. 
47.  These  figures  show  the magnitude  and  continuity 
of the official :flow  to  the  cour.ttries  and  territories 
in the  Fra11c  area,  this being  one  of the  key  ~spects of 
French aid.  The  French autho:ri  ties have neveri;heless 
tried to broaden  the  g~ographioal spread  of their aid 
and  the effects of this policy should  be felt in the 
next  few  years. 
481J  Italy's net official and :non-official aid totalled 
390  million dollars  and 550 million in 1962  and  1968, 
representing 0.92%  and  Oo76%  of  GNP  respectively~ 
Official aid  in_  the  same  years  totalled 111 million . 
and  150  million and  ncn~official aid  279  million 
and 400 million.  In 1966,  the  total flow  almost 
~each~d  ~% of:  GNP,  qut  the  level has. slnqe  fallen; 
1.n  l9b8  ~t was  Oo76%  as  compared with an  average  of Oe77% 
for the  DAC  member  countries.  · 
The  breakdo\\'rl  for the  official sector in 1962 
, and  1968 was  as  follows: 
(1)  Development Assistance  Committee. -·  15  -
Deve-lopment  aid:. · 79  million dollars .. -(51%)  and  147 million  (57%).· 
Bilateral loans:  47  million  (30%)  and  164  million  (64%) 
Contributions  to multilateral organisations: 
·32 million  (20%)  and  8  million  (3%) 
of which for 1968:  12 millions-to Eur.  Dev.  Fund 
2 
6 
'4 
" 
" 
" 
"  Asian  Dev •·  Bank 
Eur.  Invest.  Bank 
"  UN  agencies. 
49.  Gross  bilateral ai.d  from  the Italian official sector 
was  apportioned as  follows  in  19~8:  Europe,  55  million 
dollars;  .Africa,  114 million,  of which  48  million  to 
Egypt,  9 million to Ethiopia,  11 million to ·Somalia, 
12 million to  Sudan,  and  13  million to  Zambia;  'Asia, 
55  million;  Latin America,  18 million. 
These  figures  show ·that a  fairly large part of the 
bilateral flow  fromthe Italian official sector traditionally 
goes  to the Mediterranean  countries.  (e.g.  Tunisia,  Libya, 
Egypt,  Yugoslavia)  and  to Latin America  (Argentina,  ' 
Ch.ile,  Brazil and  Venezuela)..  , However,  Italy does not have 
any special preference for this  o·r  tha't  region- as is 
shown  by the very  considerable increase in 1967  ~nd 
1968 in direct loans  to African  countries. south of the 
Sahara  (Zambia,  Sudan,  Ta.nzaniat  Ghana  and  Nigeria).' 
NETHERLANDS 
.  ·-
50.  Net  official·and non..;official aid from·  the Netherlands 
totalled 114 million dollars in 1962  and  276  million  · 
in 1968,  representing 0.85%  and  1.09%  of gross national 
product respectively.  The  non--official flow  amounted  to 
49  million and  142  million  compared with official aid 
totalling 65  million and  135  million.  This  contrasts 
wi·!;h  the  situation in most  DAC  m-ember  countries,  where  the 
official sector outweighs  the nqn-official. 
The  Netherlands,  however,  is one  of tAe  few  DAO  . 
member  countries whose  total aid  (official and non-official) 
e~oeeds 1%  of gross ·national product. - 16  -
51"  The  breakdown  for_ the  official .sector was  as  follows 
in 1962  and  1968: 
Bilateral flow:  47  million dollars  (72%)  and 
113 million  (82%) 
Multilateral :flow:  18 million  (28%~  ~d 
25  million  (18%  . 
52~  The  Netherlands authorities have  repeatedly emphasised 
the  importance  they attach to multilateral aid,  and  this 
f·orm  of assistance has  always  played an  important part in the 
Net:herlands 1  developm.ent.efforts.  In 1968 multilateral 
contributions.were apportioned as  follows: 
Ind.  Dev.  Assoc. 
Aoian  Dev~ Bank 
~ur. Dev.  Fund 
UN  Dev.  Programme 
UN  Fund  :for West  Irian 
(formerly New_Guinea) 
Other  UN  agencies 
3~0 million dollars 
a-.1 
7.1 
4.5 
0.9 
" 
n 
" 
" 
f1 
" 
" 
n 
53~  As  can  be  seen,  the  size  of the  flow  to  the  European 
De,relopment  ]'und is striking in  compar:Lson  with the  otP.e~· 
sectors.  As  far as  geographical distribution is concerned: 
leaving  c:isi~e  SuriJ?-~m and  ... the;.  :putch  fies t  D.1.~  ie~ 1  the ·  I\Tetherlands 
gave  financ~al asslstance to fJ:ft~n -oountr1es  ~n.. 1968, 
the  prir.:cipal recipients being Indonesia 9  India,  Pakistant 
Ghana~ Nigeria and  Turkey~  · 
0  0 
54.  Now  that negotiations  on  the  U:nited  Kingdom's 
mc::nbershi:p  have  commenced,  .figures  should  also  be  given, 
I  think,  to  show  what  the main  colonial pow-er  of  the  19th 
century is doing to ass  .. i.st  .. the. developing  .conntries_~ 
• - 17  -
For  some  years  the  United Kingdo!rl's  net  cauital flow 
to  developing countries has  totalled  just  under~ 
1,000 million dollars  a  year, 'this amount  be1ng diVided  _ 
more  or less  equally between  the  official and non-official-
sectors.  From  1960  onwards,  the  total invariably 
exceeded  1% .of national income  ba~t in 1967 it fell to 0.  96%. 
Except in 1965 it has  remained  below the  target  of  l%·· 
o.f  GNP. 
In 1968,  more  than  90%  of British bilateral aid went 
to  the  Commonwealth  countries. 
55.  In  1962  and  1968,  the  official and non-"official flows 
were  as follows:  744 million dollars  (0.92%  of GNP) 
a..Yld  769  million. (0.  75%  of  GNP)  respectively,  of which 
•  421  million from  the  of.fi.cial  sector and  323  million from 
the non-official sector in 1962  and  428  million from  the 
official and  341 million from  the .non-official in 1968. 
Official aid in 1962  ?-nd  1968 was  apportioned as 
follows  (round f1gures): · 
·Bilateral grants  and  391  million dollars .(85%)  loans:  423  million  (86%)' 
Commonwealth  Development  27  mi~lion  ~6%)  and 
Corporation  (CDC)  28 million  5%) 
investments: 
"" 
Payments  to multilateral  41  million  (9%)  and  organisations  45  mill.!  on  {9%) 
and 
of which 25  million  (6%)  and  22  million  (4%)  to  the 
Int~  De"V".  Assoc.,  15  million  (3%)  and  20  million  (4%) 
to  UN  agencies  and  0  and  3  million  (1%)  to· 
others. 
56.  The  United  Kingdom  strongly supports  the  work  of 
the multilateral agencies,  occupying  the  second place 
in the· iist· ofcountries which contribute  to the  World  Bank 
institutions and  :fourth place as  regards  contributions 
to the  United Nations  Development  Programme. - 18  -
57.  A·t  31  June  l96B. tlie  corab±ned  total of  oontribut·ions  . 
actually paid  t.o  the  World  Bank amounted  to 260 million dollars  .• 
whils-t;  227  million and.  35  mil1.ion  had  been  paid  to  the 
International Development  Associ~tion and  the  Internati·onal 
Finance  Corporation respectively.  In 1968,  the United  · 
Kingdomts  main  contributions went _to  the  following 
organisations: 
Int. Dev.  Assoc.:  22.0  million dollars 
Asi.an  Dev.  Bank:  3 .. 0  n  " 
UN  agencies:  20.1  "  " 
~ 
451)1  " 
n 
The  geographical  spread  of gross official bilateral. 
flow in 1968 was  as  follows:  Africa,  177  million dollars; 
Americat38 million;  Asia,  l81·m.illion.  Out  of a  total 
o:f  460  million dollars,  403  million went  to  the  Commonwealth 
countries. 
0 
0  0 
i 
58"..,  This  survey of aid .f'rom  each of the  six EEC  countri.es 
and.the United  Kingdom  shows  tha-t  a  considerable  amoun.t  of 
mu.l·tilateral aid has  gradually appeared_ alongside bilateral 
aid..  · 
The  following  table illustrates this with regard_ 
to  the Six,  though in the  case  of  payments to  EEC  the 
figures  have little meaning  because  annual  payments  by 
each of  the  six. countries are  affec-ted  by ar.rears  and 
liqUidity probl~ms ~1ich do  not  give- a  picture from 
which  logicalconclusio~s can  be  drawn. 
./  o. 
~~ 
·'! ,_  19  -
Percentage  o~ publi  ...  c  aid 
!  Bilateral  i 
i 
1962  1968  I 
.·J 
Germany  ,.  80  87  20  13  15  4 
Belgltun  f  79  79  21  21  19  12 
Italy  72  85 
Netherlands  72  82 
<!- France  89  94  I 
28 
28 
11. 
f 
15  4  41 
18  1  6 
6  8  5 
0 
0  0 - 20  ~ 
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~PHE EUROPEAN  DEVEIJC~P:J1ENT  FUN~J~ 
59.  In  the' multilateral sphere,  the aid  contributed by 
the  European  Economic  Comm"Lmlty  has  a  significance which 
should be  emphasised.  Not  only is  t~1e  Community  the 
principal tradi;ng partner of the  Associated  Countries  but it 
gran·ts  substantial aid both as part of each membe·r  cotmtry  t s 
bilateral relations  and  through the  Europ€an  Development. 
Fu.nd  (EDF)  .. 
This  flow  rose  to 1,154 million dollars  between  1958 
(year of the  EEC  Treaty)  and  1969. 
60  ~  In 1965,  the  EDF  .;...  set .;up  under  the  EEC  Treaty -
was  renewed. by  the first Yaounde  .Convent~on for a  further 
five years,  with  fina~cial resources  of 730  million dollars 
of which  680  millioJ.1  was  non-refundable  and  50 million related 
to  loans  on  special terms. 
61.  Under  the second Yaounde  Convention,  signed .on 
29  July  1969~ the  EDF  was  again renewed  until 31  Ja:nuary  1975. 
This  -~chird  EDF  has  resources  amounting  to  900  million dollars, 
of which 810  m.illion is in the  form  of grants  and  , 
90  mill:i.on  in the  :form  of special-term loans.  Like  the 
previous  onet  the  second Yaounde  Convention  contains 
prpvisions  on  trade relations to  supplement  those  on  financial 
assistance and  technical oo-oneration.  Also  in 1969,  the 
Community  food  aid  programme was  first put-into  ~ffect. 
In addition to, assistance from  the  EDF,  there  is'  . 
scope·for loans  from  the  European  Investment  Bank  (EIB); 
thj_s  amounteQ.  to  70  million dollars  between  1~64 and  1969 
and will amoun-t  to  100 million between  1970 and  1975 ... 
62  ()  During the period  of  the .first  ;E~DF  1  the  Commvni ty 
devoted most  of its aid to  the  establishment of basic 
amenitteso  Since  1964 it has  mainly  been financing  capital 
investment .pr:ojects,  particularly in the  agricultural  s.ector~ 
It is intended that the third  EDJ!11 s  activity should  be 
centred  on  the  production  sector,  in particular the 
promotion  of industrialisationo  ·  ·~ 
63~  Since 1959,theyear in which  the  EDF  began  to 
operate,  the volume  of.  payments  has  steadily expanded, 
reaching 149 million dollars in 1968  (of whic-h  108 million 
for the  EDF,..-40 million for  the  EIB,  and  1  ml.llion for 
the  Co:nmission  1 s  g_eneral  budget,  which finances .:part  of  the' 
EEO  scholarship programme).  ,  . - 21-
The  annual ne-t  volume  of contributions since  1960 
has  been  as  follows  (in millions  of dollars):  · 
l 
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At  the  end·  of .1968,  the  combined total of payments 
was  647  million dollars for  the  EDF  and  125 million for  the 
EIBy''repres_enting  55%  and  51%  of their total· commitments. · 
~/64.  Contributions ·by member  countr.ies  and  the  schedule 
·  of payments in 1962 and  1968 are  shown  below: 
.Qon~t:ri  ~u~_io11s .  by:_  me~r  .. co.!.k.'rl.!rie§. 
l  ·i  l Treaty of Rome.  fY.aounde  Conv.  I  ! Yaounde  Conv.  II 
!  l 
~.  ----+--~-...;.....-.,..,-----~-~----···~ 
i Millions,  %  iMillions!  %  i  Millions.  : .  I  .  ·  lCJ  t  l  $ 
-1 
Belgium 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
I·uxembourg 
Netherlands 
i'  of $ ·  !..  !  of  ~ 
1
.  l_of  · 
l  l 
I  70  I  l  J 
J 
t 12~04  j•f  69  9.451  80  I 
. 200  134.41  :  246~5  33.771  298.5  f 
f  200  i 34 ~ 41  l  246.5  33.77 f  298.5 
8.89 1 
33ol6 ' 
40  !  6o88  i  100  13.70:  14066 
1.25  J  0.22  }  2  0.27!  2.4 
33.16 
15.62-
0.28 
8.89  70  1 12.04  1  6'  9.041  80 
J~---T-o,_T_A_L  __  -*,-5_8_1-.-2-5~~-o-o--~~~-7-3-0~-~--l-o-o--~~-----9o-o----~~--1-o-o----t 
EIB 
,  GRA_  .. __  N_n_To_T_A_~;_r  -~~-~-·._2_5~~-_  _..l~....-_s_o_o  _  _;.,; ___  ...~.l_...._l_,  o_o_o  ________  c-. 
./. - 22 ..... 
(<.~  .. ~~-----.......~  ~-- . 
:  ..  Millions  of  $  .  Percentage  .  .  .  .  ..  ..  - ................  ~-·'"'  ..  . 
1962  1968  1962  "'  196'8·  .  .  .  .  .  ,  .  •.  . 
<>  .. 
~,..,....  ~~"""'-~~  ............  ~~#~  .  .  ..  4  . 
:1.  :fo. 8 s ;1_r:; t  ~·:12£~- from  EDF  "'  53  108  98  72  .  .  .  .  Projects  .  .  .  .  ..  .  . 
~ 
do:;.1ations  (49)  (73)  (91)  (49)  ... 
"·  . 
:  loans  . 
"  Diversificat1on aid  :  (9}  (6)  .  .  ~  .  •  r  .  .  Programmes  (donations)  .  ..  .  .  .. ' 
(1) :  .  .  <>  ..  Production aid  (15)  .  (10)  .  .  - •  .  •  •  .  •  .  . 
Technical  .  .  ..  .  . 
co-operation,  .  (4)  ..  (11)  ..  (7)  .  .  .  ..  .  .  ..  •  :2o  :f:.ssj~~nce\ from EIB  .  .  . 
.... ~  .. -...  ..  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  (loans)  .  ..  - Projects  .  40  27  .  .  .  . 
: 3  0  c  .  .  f  1  .  .  .  •  _QJP!fL*-~-§l:_~_£~}1~};.§_  ..  ...  . 
"'  b  -g._Q._g e t.  .··  .  .  .  .  :  .  ..  .  .  .  Technicq.l  co-ope!"ation  1  1  2  1  .. 
.  ..  (I'  .,  "  .  ~:,.,..,.........·~-.~  ...........  ~  .. ~~~  .. 
:>,..,.......,.. 
/i•  .. 
TOTAL  .  54  149  100  .  100  .  .  .  ..  .  .  . 
_..'"·"~""~-~,.....,·~  .  ....._.. ....  .,  .  "  0~**  •  .,.........~~~-~)<>'"!11"-.  !*'*·-~~---- -·  " 
.. 
(1)  ·  Struc·tural improvements  and  p:r·J..CC  support. 
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VI. 
A.DOCTRINE  OF  EUROPEAN  AID 
.,-~.~~..,.~-."'"''~~..  ~ 
65.  Fj~nancial sta.tistics,  however,  do not  convey adequately 
what  the aid thus rendered by EEC  to the developing countries 
under tho  tv;o  successive Yaounde  Conventions really means. 
It must  not  be  forgotten that  the  aid goes to 18  African 
states  (including Madagascar)  whose national incomes  aro.very 
·low  and  a~o derived to  only a  minimal  extent from  industrial 
sources~ 
66.  Thor~ has  thus gradually  cmerg(~d a  European doctrine 
of aid to tho less-developed countries.  To  be sure, 
Mr.  Vcdovato,  the rapporteur of tllc  Council of Europe '.s 
Committee  on  Economic  Affairs  and Development,  quotos.(para.  6) 
a  statement by Mr •.  Martino,  then  a  European  Commissioner. 
in support of tho  vie"t1'  that. EEC' s  activity in this field 
is influenced more  by practical-· than by doctrinal 
considerations.  But thisaoctr1ne1  it seems  to me,  ha.s 
two  essential aspects,  vi_zf>: 
A.  First.:  financial ald nnd.,  oven more  so,  food  aid 
count  fo1~ little unless  the persons responsible become 
invol  vod  themscl  vcsi  thl..,ough  technical  assistance~ 
in the  joint development venture. 
Co-.oporation means  working together:  it is essential; 
not  just to supply cq.pita.l but to  put it towork 
through  joint effort so that the best possible usc  ." 
may  be  made  of it in terms of fostering development.· 
HoncG  the now  Yaounde  Convention's provisions  aimed 
o.t-incroaslng the-Associated Countries'  responsibility 
(Bcr  so.x1i  report,  para.  22) ;  hence,  too,  EEC' s  growing 
./  effort in tho matter of technical assistance,  entailing 
not brief vlsits by  o.xports but periods 9f residence 
by persons :responsible in the countries qoncerned 
during whj_ch  they work with those it is wished  to, 
help. 
Such is the  significance of the general technical 
co-operation with Which  EEC  is providing  the 
Associated Countries,  co-oporution which is.both 
expanding  and  being diversified.  In.  this-regard.,  it 
must  be  said~  tho flow  of human  capital on both a 
community and  n.  bilateral basis,  has  boon cxcmplo.ry  • 
.  /. \ 
\ 
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European assi.stants nrc  by no  means  meeting with -the  same 
crit1olsm as international experts  (Bersani report, 
paras()  38  and 39),  and  the five  theoretical phnses  of 
planning in tho Jaclcson  Study_.  quoted by  JVIJ.")#  Bcrsani 
(para.  52),~  will have difficulty in convincing the 
assisted countries of international cff'octivcncss., 
67.  'rochnical aid  under tho  .EDF  comprises: 
(a)  Tho  supply of experts to study new  rosotn~  cos 
and solutions to spcci.al  development  problems; 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
General  development potential studies;-
Thc  ~Nn.rd of full-time scholarships  (in Europe 
nnd  the Associ.atcd  Countries)  and  correspondence 
course grants; 
The  arrangir..g of periods of tral.ning  in.  member 
oou..~tries  and  't~i th the Commission; 
. 
Part-financing of a  Community  programme  to 
pu.bl1cise  tpe Associated Countries'  products, 
68.,  Technical  assistance connected with investment,  which is 
gc;herally incl,udcd in the projects themselves,  is estimated 
b.v  the  EEC  Commission at about  15%  (59  million dollars at 
31 December  1968)  of total investment  from  tho  second  EDF. 
D.  Secondly:  iJc  is only too  obvious  that,  in a  little-developed 
com1.try whoso  nation.ol  income  coraes  mainly from  tropical 
p-raoducts,  t~nrkot forces  n:~o  bound  to oxort  a  depressing 
influence on liv:lng  stand.ards~  What.,  therefore,  would 
be  the usc  of food  aid or financial  aid or even 
tccr.i.:r1ical  assistance if the-·-results  of n  coDntryt s  efforts 
wcn"le  aba.~doncd to the hurly•burly of world prices? 
69"  Consequently,$'  whntcver their devotion to  economic 
liberalism_,  it has been  impossible  f'or  tl'le  six EEC  co1mtrics 
to tako a  selfish attitude and  ignor0 the ·noed  to. organise 
these agricultural markets}'  in.. the  samo  vray  as  the developed 
countries  (including the United States)  organise their own 
agricultural markets. 
Not only did the first Yaounde  Convention provide  fo1.,  capit-al 
to promote  the .~tabilisatio:n. of  prioe~(and  the~atve.rsif·icat:ton 
of  crop:s~  but  the second  one  has maintartn.cd an emergency aid 
ftmd  to deal with the more  serious  s1tuntio~1s arising from 
fluctuations  iri world prices.  · 
./. • 
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70.  Thus.t  apart  from measuring  up  to the  aims  set for the 
United Nations'  Second  Development  Decad(3,  and  indeed 
implementing  them  more  fulLy  than any other international 
community
1 s  policy,  the development  aid policy of EEC  oven 
places emphasis  on .this essential aspect of stabiliscition 
for tropical productsund gives  tho fullest possible 
encouragement  to tho  conclusion of world-wide  agreements  on 
each of  the principal products. 
0 
0  0 
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VII. 
THE  UNITED  NATIONS 
71 •.  'rhc harmony  bet~,recn EEC's  development  aid objectives and 
those for the United Nations'  Second  Decade  can be  seen 
from  the Pearson Report  (1)~ -issued  on behalf of the  Commission 
on International Development. 
The  report  contains information and recommendations  as 
well as an analysis of 'the highly significant data  regardin~ 
the rich industrialised nations'  role in the  Second Decade. 
72..  The  targets .set out in 'the report are  as  follows: 
(1)  Creating a  framework for free  and  equitable 
international  trade~ either through the 
elimination of obstacles to the expansion of 
the less advanced  coUhtries'  export earnings 
o:r  ·through the adoption of  a  system of geno1..,al 
non-reciprocal tariff ·preferences. 
(2)  Promoting  m~tually beneficial flows  of 
foreign private  invost~ent. 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
Establishing a  better partnership,  a  clearer 
purpose.,  and  a  greater coherence in development 
aid. 
-L~crcasing tho volume  o~ aid,.  The  aim here is 
that official development_ a1d  should reach 0.70%  of 
donor countr1osr  GNPs  by 1975  and in no  case later 
than 1980, ,taking the form of grants or 
low-interest loans. 
Meeting tho problem of mounting debts.· 
{6)  Making  aid adminlstrat5.on more  effective. 
(7)  Redirecting tcc-hnt·cal  n.ssj.stance.  This  means  that 
technical assistance shoUld  adapt its ob~jcctives 
and  methods  more  closely to developing countries' 
needs and  beco~c integrated  wi~h capital assistance. 
(8)  Slowing the growth of population. 
(9)  Revi tal  ising aid to education  C?-nd  res'earch. 
(10)  Strcngtheni~~ the multilaterai aid system.  This 
implies  t~hat multilateral aid should be raised to 
20%  of total official ~development aid by 1975• 
.  ./. 
(1)  "Partners in Development",  New  York~ 1969. 
j  . 
1 
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73.  It mustbe  sa1d thntthe ronsonwhy EEC  is trying more 
than anvone  elDe  to, achieve  these targets,  vJhy  it de.se:rves  less 
than anyone  else the  criticism voiced at the  end  of the 
First Development  Decade  (Bersani  repo~t, para. 32),  is that  , 
it has not left j_ts  action u.ntil  the United Nations itself acts 
(it, Will  be recalled vvhat  difficulties are being  experienced  . 
in preparing ·the  opening of the  So.cond  Decade  for  21~  October 1970), 
74.  Tho  disappointing  outcome  of the United Nations Economic 
and  Social  Council  t s  last session i.s  hie;hly rogrettn.bleli'  No 
agreement  was  reached either on  intornationo.l  trade measures 
or on a  date for transfers of resources  from  the affluent to 
the poor  countries- or on scientific and  technical aid terms 
or  on the East European countries  1  contribution.· 
75"  However,  without ttJai ting for agreement  to be  reached 
or for the Doc-a.de.to  begin,  th~ six EEC  countries are making 
a  highly praiseworthy effort which  exceeds what is being 
asked fo:r  at inte.rnational level,  as can be  seen  belo\~: 
]!,f~i  .. c.i,al, .and  non  .... off!9,l~l  ..  n~.s.i.~.!,~p,.cr,e_Sfs.  a  ,2C!'£c.nt.a~EL.()f .qJf~ 
Gcrmnn:y 
Belgium 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
(United  Kingdon1) 
1962  -
0.69 
0.91 
1.86 
0~92 
1.86 
(0~92) 
].2.6.~ 
1.25 
1•17 
1.17 
0.76 
1.17 
(0. 75) 
196Q  (1) 
1.30 
1.10 
1~24 
1.03 
1.32 
(0.83) 
76.  ~vc are convinced  that the best contribution EEC  can make 
to  t'VorJ~d·.,..vl:l.de  development pollcy is to eont;tnue its own  efforts. 
Tho  practical results thus  obtained should enable the·internationa.l 
discussions to reach a  conclusion more  quickly and  su.rely. 
0 
0  0 
I  Q/'Q. 
(1)  Figures given by  Mr~  \'l!ostertel~p in the  opinion report 
of the  Cor.1mittce  on External Trado ·Relati.ons  ..  (paro.  ..... 16). --28 -·' 
VIII. 
INTEftNATIONAL  AGREEMENTS ' ON. TROPICAL  PRODUCTS 
r.:  ..  .,•••~N~  ..  ~~~r!!t  .•..  ~  ...  P  . . 5 ...........  ~'-------
77.  In the essential sphere,of world-wido stabilisation 
agreements  on tropical products,  it must  be admitt9d that 
results are  o~ten dj.sappoint1ng1  but here too EEC,  ·as-principc:l:l 
buyer of  some  of thesc.products,  has always  acted,in favocy 
of'  an international arrangement. 
There is no  need to consider in detail how  important it is 
for the developing .countries that the prices of· such products 
.should be stabilised and that they should have  opportunities 
for selling them  on the 11eo.l thy markets.  Suffice. it to  · 
recall that almost  90%  of the poorer.countries'  export  earnings 
comes  from foreign sales of primary  commodities~  that half  · 
of those countries derive more  than 50%  of their earnings 
from  one product and that three-quarters of  them  obtain more 
than three-fifths of their earnings from  throe products. 
78.  Tho  Comrnunity  as  such is already a  party to several 
international agreements  and is preparing to  take part in 
othc'rs.  It :Ls  a  party to the·world  agreement  on cereals., 
which comprises  a  convention on wheat .and another on food  aid.· 
Renewal  of  the agreement when it expires in 1971  is likely to  . 
give rise to considerable difficultie.s.,  for since the nwheat war" 
in 1969 the world pric.e- of t1heat  ha.s  been at a  level lo\1er 
than the· one  speqified in the agreement.  When  negotiations  · 
·start, the  Community  ought  t·o  take  up  a  position in favour  of 
keeping-the minimum  price at the level laid down  in the 
agreement. 
79.  The  Conm1unity  also took part, within the framework  of  GATT, 
in the rcnc-v'lal  for  three years of the 1962  agreement  on 
cotton textiles, which had  been renewed in 1967  and is due  to  expire on3Q·""""scptember  1970.  But  the liberalisation of trade 
in thj.s  lending sector is far from  being achieved.,  ei  thor 
because of the continuing exceptional nature of the long•te:rm 
•  agreement or because cotton textile imports arc still 
governed by bilateral arrangements in the case of many 
countries.  The  recent failure of the negotiations between 
the United States and  Japan merely darkened prospects for 
world market stabilisation,  expecially a.s  the Americans 
intend to exclude textile.s :from  the generalised preferences. 
It may  be recalled hcere  :that tho  Community has  ofrered 
India and Prucistan an appreciable increase in overall cotton 
quotas  and has.simplified administrative-procedures in order 
to secure greater flexibility in trade with those  two  countries  • 
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8o..  The  GommunitY.:t  .. moreovor·.t  ... has decidcd··to talco part -:!Ji  the 
United Nations negotiations in Geneva  on  tho  Penowal  of  the 
inte:r·na.tional tin agreement.  Its contribution to the 
stabilisation o:r-tin prices cannot fail to be beneficial to tho 
under:..dovolopcd  producing countries. 
81.  EEG  also intends  to accede to the intcrnntional agreement 
on  olj_vo  oil,  to which  only some  o.r  its member  stntos ·are ·at 
prosciitpa7ties.  ·There is no  doubt  that  tho  Comrnissj.on' s 
approach to  tho  council to this effect will be well received 
by the latter. 
82.  The  Commtt.ni ty ·is taking part as an observer· in the 
·  .. ·negotiations on the world  cocoa  agreer.1ent  which arc being 
conducted by the  uNCTAD~ Bourd~n Geneva"  The  producing 
countries  (Ghana  and Brazil), it t'fill  be recalled$  are asking 
:for an increase in the minimum  prices stipulated in the 1967 
memorandum  and are meeting with opposition from  tho United  States~ 
83.  Furthermore,  the  Commission recently submitted a  draft 
decision to the Council with a  view to the  Commu.~.J.ity' s 
participc.ting in the  internationo.l coffee  ngreoment.  the 
Community  accounting for. about  25%  or"·'*world  import  trade in 
that commodity  (all the rnem'ber  stntes nrc parties to the 
agreement  :tn  thG1r  own  name).  This  agreement~ whic0.  expires 
in September 1973  and to wh1ch41  cx1)ort:l.ng  countries and 
22  importing countries  (representing 98% ·and· 9<Y;b  of world 
trnde in coffee)  arc par~ies, is of the utmost  importance 
to the developing  countries~ 
84..  On  the other  hand~  the  Community  is not a  part~ to  . 
the  intcrnation~l ·s~~g,~ agreement,;  negotiated in 19G8  under 
tl1.e  auspices of  l)"!t{;if.t~]),  This  agreement  together with the 
Commonwealth  Sugar Agreement,,  the  American  Sugar Act  and  the 
agreement  between Cuba  and  the  USSR  form  the bulk of 
international regulations governing \'lorld  trade in this product. 
The  Comrnuni ty' s  position depends  on  vV'ha t  decisions 
the United Ktngdom  tnlces  when  tho  Commonwealth  Sugar Agreement 
runs  out  on 31  December  1974,  In any  event~- sugar W'lll  no 
doubt be  one  of  the  fm1damental  difficulties in tho 
negotiations  on British membership. 
85.  Since  the  Bi-x  arc  surpltit?  countries,_. t,ho  Gommu...1J.ity  has. 
not granted full exemption to any developing country for its 
sugm"!  production  (only half of Surinnm'·'s  sugar production is 
regarded as  Communlty  production_.  tho Netherlands hav;I.ng 
financial responsibi.li  ty for  the other hc.lf).,  The  Community's 
accession to  the internationnl sugar  agreement:~ which is  · 
supported in partieulnr by the .Netherlands  and  wns  discussed by 
the  Cotmcil  of Ministers of Agriculture in July  1970~ is 
therefore h·ighly desirable. 
0 
:>  0 • 
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IX. 
THE  COMr-lONWEALTH 
~  .  ...~.-~ 
86.  From  all the  information given above  sorrteidca can be 
formed  of the extent  and nnture of what  EEC  hns  been doing 
since 1957  in favour  of tho Associated Africnn Statos and 
l\·iudagn.scar" 
An  idea should now  bo  given of  the·considcrablc 
.transrormntion that wolJ.ld  occur in this respect i.f  tho 
lJnitcd Kingdomo.nd  other applicants  joi11:ed  the·Qommunity. 
87."  l'hc prin,cipal  problem Will concern tho cOuntries which 
he.vc  commercial.,  historical- and institutional tics with the 
applicant countries.,  vu.  ~ apart from  Greenland .and.  the 
·.  Farce Isles - the British Con1111on11Cal th countries, 
Ail  these countries  (1)~ withthe exception of  Canada, 
New  Zcnlnnd  and  Australia.,  belong  ·~ the third world. 
88.  As  we  all know.,  the problem of  the  Commonwealth  is to be 
studied in detail during the forthcoming negotiations,  as it 
was  in tlle negotiations which .failed in 1963.  The  basic data 
nre now  somewhat  different,  as things have  changed--since  then. 
The  Community  hus  its~l.f established direct links with some 
of the  Commonwealth  countries  (the Arusha Agreement ·and  th~ 
agreement  signed with Nigeria,  which ha$  not been ratified 
but is still tabled).  ·  Moreover,  there have been  some 
tariff reductions as a  result of the Kennedy Round,  not 
to mention other independent  suspensions  of _tariffs applied 
either by  EEC  or by the United  Kingdom~  .Thus,  some  action 
has already been taken on  th,c  problems.  The  same  applies 
to  the reduction of the  Common  Customs  Tariff for a  number 
of tropical products,. including unroa.sted  coffee,  cocoa and 
palm oil,  under  the  ne~1 association agreement  between EEC  and 
the Associated  .Af~ican States and  Madagascar  (Yaotu"lde  II)  (2) .. 
(1) 
(2) 
.  ; . 
India,  Pakistan,  Ceylon,  Ghana;  Cyprus, ·Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone,  Tanzania_,  Jamaica,  Trinidad and  Tobago,  . 
Uganda,  Na.laysia,  Kenya,,  rvTalawi,  .  Mal ta1  Zambia~  G&mbia, 
Singapore,  Guyana~  Botswana,  Lesotho,  Barbados, 
Nauritius_,  Yemon  (South). 
Gf' i1  the  Commission,_ s  Opinion to the  Council  on . the 
applicatlons ror membership by the United Kingdom.,  Ireland~ 
Denmark  and  Norway~  1  October 1969 •. - 31  -
891»  It will have  to be  seen what lfriks there will be between 
the  enlarged  Community  and·  the under  .... develblJed ·countries of 
the  Commonwealth~  In Iv1ay,  the  Community's  Council  of 
Ministers ·agreed in broad outl.ine what attitude to adopt 
towards tho  Commonwealth  countries following  the United Kingdom's 
cntryo 
The  developing countries of  ~he Commonwealth  may  be 
divided' into· those  in tho Fnr Etlst,  Asia  and  Oceania·,· those 
j~n Africa,  those in the  Caribbean and  the  Indian Ocican,  and 
the dependent  territories, 
90.  The  Councllts  agreement  would  scorn  to be  as foll9ws: 
(1). 
(ii) 
Th:e  A:sian .and .Far  Eflst  cou11tri~s  (Ceylon.~  Indin, 
Mal-eysfa~rutr5tnn;srr~a.p0r0T:-_  The  transitional 
porj_od will be  long onough·to enable tho enlarged 
·Community  to study the difficulties which might 
arise- In the _mcantime;1  th~ countries concerned· 
l~j.ll  continue to receive the advantages already  ' 
gran,ted to· them by the  Community  and  they will also 
hnve  benefited from  the  system of ngencralised 
preferencesn •  ·  < 
rr11e, African countries  (Kenya,  Tanzania,  Zambia..,  Nige!'ia, 
ffi1C:na~'715ct. r:  ...... Tf70's"'e-will  be free to  choo~e betv-Jeon 
joining EEC  s  association with  the Asso61ated  African 
States and Madagasea:r.,  concludlng  ad  ~1oc  agreen'leht.s 
and  entering into purely commercial ,o.grccmcnts  ... 
The  p:/?oblem  to which  the Ministers gave  lengthy 
consideration v.ras  that of  the nature.··  ~"'ld  character 
of -the  association to be  negotiated;  from  1973  on1~o.rds) 
with the  CommonvTcal th countries w·htch  choose  the  same · 
s:ys.tem  (with a  viet-.; .·to  its coming  in. to force  in 
1975~  on  the  ~xplry of the  second  Yaounde  Convention). 
A  kind of declaration of intent has been prepared,· 
specifying as follo"t'.rs: 
(a)  The  cnlu.rged  Community  is ready to pursue 1 ts 
association policy in regard both. to  th~  . 
Associated African States and Mndagnsco.r  and 
to snch African Commonwealth  countries as 
apply to take part in it. 
(b)  The  enlargement  of the  Community  and  the possible 
extc.nsj~on of  the association must not rosuJ.  t  in  · 
any  ~tcnkening of relations vlith the countrios . 
at present  associated'~~ 
(c)  The.Community's  objective is· to preserve· its 
achievements  o.nd  fundamental  principles. 
This,  tnc:reforc,  should also be  the objective 
of  the enlarged  Community. J 
(iii) 
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,!h~,  sar,ibboa:q ,and  ;I:!1Sl~.Dl1:  Ocea.l'l;.,CO,up"t.r,ic~ /(Jamaica, 
Tr~nJ.clad etc. J:  'FUll  a,ssociatJ..on is not envisaged, 
with these countries as their problems  should be 
dealt  with under specific agreements,  such as 
the  Commonwealth  Sugar Agreement •. 
91.  For all tho dependent territories  (1)  with the exception 
of' Hong  Kong  the system adopted for  the  Overseas  Countries 
and Territories is envisaged. 
92.  If the enlarged Yaounde  association is joined by the 
African·commonwealth countries  (2)_.  whose  economic  structures 
and production arc for· the  most  part-comparable to  those of 
the Associated States,  the enlarged  Community vill then be 
able to adopt  a  comprehensive solution for the under-developed 
African countries.  But it should not be forgotten that 
many  tropical products  of these countries compete with those 
of tho Associated States:  hence  the danger of a  decrease 
in the Associated States  t  outlets,.  Of·  the .African  Common1t1ealth 
countries,  Zambia  and  Ghnna  have  the greatest economic potential. 
Their production is roughly equivalent to that of the 
French-speo.l-ting  countries.,  viz,._  palm oil,  coffee,.  tropical 
products,  cocoa,  diamonds,  ~ine.ral~ etc. 
93'•  In the financial  sphere.,  however,  the entry of Norway, 
Denmnrlr.,  Sv1cdcn  (possibly)  and  tho United  Kingdom  seems  likely 
to be desirable,  s'i.nce  the Scnndinavian countries,  at least, 
are  among  the countries which are doing the most  as regards 
aid to developing  co'U.D.tries.  For another thing,  the creation 
of nn even bigger m~ket in Africa l'lould,  in the long rtin., 
make  it nossible to achieve a  mere  rational division of 
labour in  tha-t  continent.  Alnost the whole  of Africa 
would  be  associated with the European Connnunity.  Only the-
Portuguese colonies,  South-Africa and the latter's neighbours 
(Rhodosia,-·Botswana.,  $outh-East Africa)  would  remain outside · 
this  intor-contincnt~1 association.  As  far as  the North 
African countries are  concerned,  virtually all the 
Mediterranean ones would  be associated with the  Community$ 
sj.nce  Tunisin, and Morocco  arc already covered by a  partial 
agreement,  Algeria has special relations on  an undefined 
legal basis  and  Egypt  is shortly to begin explorntory talks 
with EEC.  . 
(1) 
(2) 
.;. 
Gibraltar~  (Rhodesi-a),  Seychelles,  St.  Helqna,  .Swaziland, 
Bahamas,  Bermuda,  British Honduras,  British West  Indies., 
Falkland Islands,  Brunei,  Hong  Kong_,  Fiji,  Gilbert and 
Ellice Island.,  New  Hebrides.,  Solomon  Islands,  Tonga. 
BotSt...;ana,.  Gambia,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Lesotho,  Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone,  Tanzania,  Uganda,  Zambia• - 33  -
94· ~  IV£1".  Hesterterp$  ~~n his repor-'c  to the  Commfttoc  on 
External 'l"'rade  Relations.~ rightly recalls (paras  ..  4  and 5) 
ltJhat. the  Community's  att~tude in the enlargement negotiations 
is founded  on as far as  the Commonwealth·is  concerned  .. 
'l"lhe  dcclo.rntion of intent made  by the  Council  of  ~1inisters on 
1  and  2  April 1963  wp.s  based  on Article 58  of the first 
YaourJ.de  Convention;  and  1 ts exact  terms were  repeata(l by 
the  Council at its session on 11  and.12  May  1970  ....  referred 
to by ].Vfr.  Bcrsan:l. in his report to the Political Committee 
(pnra.  25)  ...  so as to open the three possibilities  (joining 
the Yaounde  association,  concluding ad  hoc  agreements., 
entering into .trade  agrec111ents)  to the African countries 
of tho  Commonwealth  and  to them alone. 
For  EEC  has deliberately engaged in development  aid 
for the benefit -of  the poorest;  · our regional  co.,...operntion 
is inter•Afl"licnn  (Westerterp  report~ para.. 5)  and  enlargement 
cannot  upset that  pattern~ since,  as Mr.  Westc1"lterp _points 
out  (pa:raj}  12),  ttthe financial- r.c.sources  of the  Commun.itr;, 
even when it is enlarged,  are  ulways  bound  to be lioi  ted'  .• 
0 
0  0 
95.  This general  survey. of the association which· may  come 
about  between the  Common\\'ea:L th countries and  the Europco.n 
Com.munity  ·will suffice to  shovv  that here is one  of the main 
problems raised by  the  enlargement  of the  Community. 
Just as the current applicants'  entry would  increase 
EECts  share in wo:rld  trade from  17  .. 2%  (1969 flgure)  to 
25~6%,  so  EEcr s  sho.re  in the developing countries'  imports 
would rlso frott 21$ 69b  to 30 .. 7%  and  in their exports from  '  4  ot.  30.al%  to  3 .2 1o  . 
Such an increase, if decided quict:ly  ,.  will not be 
beneficial without  some  political strengthening., 
Tho  present structures,  which derive from.the Treaty of 
Rome;'J  are scarcely enough to sustain EEC  in its present state 
of  Ul"lification')  As  I  have already said.,  political nboosts" 
a'b  the highest level would be necessary,  and more  cf.fective 
structures would need to be  adopted  through new  treaties. 
This will be  one  of the inevitable  consequences,_~  in  ~"1Y event, 
of enlargement. 
vJith aid to the developing countr.i.es1 - the problem ·1s 
exactly the  same. 
.;. 
t ' 
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96.  As  ~1r.  Bersani well ·puts it (para.  28) 1 
1ithe SiX must 
therefore see to it. that tho interests of the associated states 
arc not harmed  by the membership  of the European states or by 
the association of other developing cotultrios". 
If tho political gain from  the  two  Yaounde  Conventions 
is not to be lost, i.e. amongst  other things the human 
:tnvolvcmcnt  and  the  concern for preserving living sto.ndards 
by ena.blin.g all produ.ccrs  i.n  tho  developing countries to earn 
their living,  we  must  not  content ourselves mcrGly 1-<Jith 
adding·· together markets  and  accumulating  trade;  the  aim 
is not to obtain more  impressive percentages, it is to 
maintain a  specifically European aid. 
97~- · The  aj.m  cannot  th~refore be,  as Mr.  Amrehn  seems  to 
say in his ropor-'G ,, on behalf of the  Counc 11 of Europe 
1 s 
Political Affairs  Comrnittee~- simply to co-ordinate 
biln.tcral aid programmes  ~po.ra•  18) 6  nor to go  ~om a 
regional aid policy to a·' globaln  one.  \mat  should be 
sought is the balance which .Mr ..  Mnrtino;  then. a  European 
Comm..i.ssioner~. ·referred to in his statement to the  Cou..."'lcil  of 
Europe which Mr.  Vodovato  rightly quotes  {para.  7)#  viz.; 
"The  Community's  development assistance stems :from the 
need to arrive at a.-balance -'between,  on  the one hand,  the 
responsibilities arlsing from  the implementation of its 
economic  policy as regards the third world in general  and~ 
-on the other hand,  the definite obligations which it has 
contracted in virtue of the associations concluded with a 
number  of developing countricsn. 
Even from  only the standpo·int which the  Council  of 
Europe's rapporteurs unfortunately seem  to  adopt,  which is 
market-economjs::.,  facility of trade and  :tmports  from  the 
third world~  the figures  shoHs  clearly that the criticism 
levelle-d against  EEC  in regard· to world policy does hot 
carry any welght;  as  Mr ..  l\.mreh..YJ.  himself observes  (para.  8 j  .ll  • 
the trade being conducted with Latin f.lmerica  gives no 
.cause :ror  complaj.nt. 
At  the  same  time,  however.,  EEC  is firmly resolved to 
continue its regional aid,  because- it is effectivt;1 
because it goes  to the -poorest countries  a..""ld  because it 
is of an original and  spec_ific' kind_,  henc-e  closely bound 
up with  E~opean unification. 
98~  1vo  therefore hope  that tho current negotiations with 
the United Kingdom  and the other applicants will go  t_o  the 
heart of thj.ngs  and will re.sul"c  in political agreement  on 
the continuation of progress towards  European unification 
and  the continun.tion at th(J  same  time of an effective and 
humane  policy to ben.efit the less developed  countries~ 
.;. iW 
~ 
~ 
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CONCLUSIONS 
1.  The  future  of European unification must  be  based on 
the  Community  of the Six. 
2.  This  Community,  which has been open since the outset to 
all European nations of good will,  constitute·s,  after the 
two  world-wide  European wars" and_ in a  world where 
nationalism is growing  in intensity,  n  lr::ind  of enchanted 
isle. 
3. 
4. 
The  firs'c  duty  j.s  to maintain and  continue the irreversible 
p~ogrcss by tho  Six towards unification.  In this connection 
it may  be noted that the rqport by the six Foreign 
Ministers foreshadows  a  decisive step which will include 
foreign policy_that notable area of national sovereignty. 
The  universally desired enlargement of the  Connnunity  to 
include the applicant countries,  particularly_the 
United  Kj.ngdom,  raises the crucial question whether the 
political will in favour of unification,  which 
gradually emerged in a  small framework,  can lt:eep  its 
strength and  effec_tivcness in a  wider framework. 
5.  ·.  Similarly,  there arises the question as to whn.t  form will 
be taken,  after  enlar~e~1cnt, by the  aid to developing 
countrl.es 1"lhich  the  s~x Common  Market  States nre 
providing at a  high level,  entrusting the management  of · 
a  substantial part of it to their European  Community~ 
6.  This  European multilateral aid meets  the aims  set for  the\ 
United Nations'  Second  Development  Decade  and  can be 
soon to be particularly  effective~  It rc·f·lccts  a 
concern both for the involvement .of  the co-operators 
in the  joint development  effort and  for  the preservo.tion 
of the living standards of the producers assisted, 
notably through world-wide  agreements which organise 
'+Ud  stabilise markets. 
\ 
7.  The  considerable expansion of aid that would  occur 
should the United l{ingdom,  with its Commonwealth  links, 
join the  Community  must not result in a  mere  adding  .... together 
· of bilateral assistance efforts but in political 
agreement  on the maintenance  and  ext:ension of  " 
specifically European aid. 
/ 